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ABSTRACT
As the world becomes increasingly dependent on technology, researchers in industry and academia
endeavor to understand how technology is used, the impact it has on everyday life, the artifact
life-cycle and overall integrations of digital information. In doing so, researchers are increasingly
gathering ‘real-world’ or ‘in-the-wild’ residual data, obtained from a variety of sources, without
the explicit consent of the original owners. This data gathering raises significant concerns
regarding privacy, ethics and legislation, as well as practical considerations concerning investigator
training, data storage, overall security and data disposal. This research surveys recent studies of
residual data gathered in-the-wild and analyzes the challenges that were confronted.
Amalgamating these insights, the research presents a compendium of practices for addressing the
issues that can arise in-the-wild when conducting residual data research. The practices identified
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in this research can be used to critique current projects and assess the feasibility of proposed
future research.
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INTRODUCTION
Information and communication technologies
(ICTs) are now essential parts of the
infrastructure of the modern global society.
These technologies are becoming ubiquitous,
remote and mobile. They enable a multitude of
services and information to be delivered to an
end-user on demand and on a diverse range of
end-user devices. Examples include access to
personal information and services, such as
social media sites, shopping, banking; social
activities, such as online activism and voting;
and corporate information, such as accounting
systems or business plans. Indicative of this
phenomenon, Gartner (2016), for example, has
estimated that the combined worldwide
shipments of tablets, mobile phones and
personal computers (PC) will reach 2.4 billion
units in 2016.
Separately, the International
Telecommunication Union reported that there
were more than 7 billion mobile-cellular
subscriptions in 2015 (International
Telecommunication Union, 2015). Gartner
(2012) has also predicted that annual
individual household broadband consumption
will increase from 464 gigabytes in 2011 to 3.3
terabytes in 2016.
In order to understand the extent and
practice of everyday activities mediated
through ICTs, researchers have increasingly
turned to a range of ‘in-the-wild’ methods for
data gathering (Hagen, Robertson, Kan, &
Sadler, 2005). Chamberlain, et al. (2012) have
argued that HCI researchers are increasingly
leaving the laboratory and turning towards ‘in-
the-wild’ studies as a better way of
understanding user behavior. Separately,
Rogers et al. (2011) argues that research
conducted in-the-wild can generate results and
insights that cannot be obtained in laboratory
environments.
The increasing capabilities of digital
storage devices has also meant that there is an
increasing amount of information left resident
long after its usefulness to its original creator
has ceased. Recent research by digital forensic
researchers has recovered a wealth of personal,
sensitive and corporate information from
relatively small samples of storage devices.
Glisson, et al. (2011) recovered over 11,000
data artifacts from just 49 mobile devices
acquired from secondary markets. In additional
research, Glisson and Storer (2013) recovered
over 7,000 artifacts from 32 mobile phones
issued to employees in a Fortune 500 company.
Similarly, studies by Jones (Jones, Dardick,
Davies, Sutherland, & Valli, 2009; Jones, Valli,
Sutherland, & Thomas, 2008) examined a
sample of used hard disks, and reported that
over 70% contained personally identifiable
information. A similar study conducted by the
Real Data Corpus (RDC) project obtained 158
re-sold hard disks, from which they were able
to extract 75 gigabytes of data (S. L. Garfinkel
& Shelat, 2003).
This residual data is of considerable
interest to both researchers in industry and
academia for several reasons, for example:
 Residual data research provides insights
into the magnitude of privacy and
security risks taken by owners of digital
devices when they dispose of them. By
conducting surveys of residual data on
devices sourced from secondary
markets, researchers can monitor trends
in personal, sensitive and corporate
information. This data can be examined
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to identify risks that can be used to
implement successful security breaches.
In turn, researchers can evaluate the
effectiveness of new security and
privacy counter measures, such as
custom operating system modifications,
in an effort to improve data deletion
mechanisms and real-time data breach
notification solutions.
 Collection of data sets from residual in-
the-wild sources provides digital
forensics researchers with realistic test
cases on which to evaluate new and
existing software tools and practices.
Generating realistic data sets
artificially, for evaluation purposes, can
be extremely difficult due to the
variability and idiosyncrasies of
individual behavior. Taking data sets
from in-the-wild sources provides the
opportunity to evaluate forensic tools
against targets that can be more
representative of real-world
investigations. Insights into digital
forensic tool performance, potentially,
impacts residual data credibility in
legal settings. Recent research
highlights the importance of residual
data credibility by indicating that the
introduction of residual data as
evidence in legal atmospheres is
escalating (Berman, Glisson, & Glisson,
2015; McMillan, Glisson, & Bromby,
2013).
 More widely, in-the-wild residual data
is of interest to researchers who seek to
better understand how users behave
with ICTs outside of controlled
laboratory settings. The residual data
contained on devices, such as message
conversations, pictures, application logs
and office documents, can be used to
reconstruct details of user behavior.
This source of information can provide
direct insights into how ICTs are used
In-The-Wild, rather than how users say
they are used. It also initiates
discussions on ethical handling of
residual digital data.
The investigation of residual data sources
raises serious legal and ethical considerations.
The very act of investigating the extent of
privacy risks through analysis of residual data
sources creates the potential for those very
risks to be realized, inadvertently or otherwise,
by the researcher.  Unlike other forms of in-
the-wild research, it is unlikely that the former
owners of the devices examined will have
provided explicit consent for their data to be
included in the study which is a standard
practice in research involving human
participants (British Psychological Society,
2010). Any subsequent analysis of the data
found on the storage devices, therefore, raises
concerns about the rights and expectations of
the device's former owners. In particular, there
may be concerns as to their rights or
expectations of privacy, which may persist well
after the device has been discarded or sold.
Expectations of privacy by the former
owners of ICT devices may be complex, given
that the definition and understanding of
privacy itself is multi-faceted and remains a
contested topic (Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011).
Several authors have conducted literature
reviews in the area of privacy, demonstrating
the breadth of issues (Belanger & Crossler,
2011; Smith & Milberg, 1996).  Despite this
complexity and disagreement, it seems clear
from the literature that the use of residual
data in research raises privacy concerns. Clarke
(1999) defines privacy as “the interest that
individuals have in sustaining a personal space,
free from interference by other people and
organizations”. The work identifies four aspects
of privacy: person, personal behavior, personal
communication and personal data (Clarke,
1999); all of which may be affected by the
collection of residual data. In addition,
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Belanger and Crossler (2011) note, in their
survey of privacy research, that control over
secondary uses of personal information through
“the practice of using data for purposes other
than those for which they were originally
collected” recurs in several definitions of
privacy. Therefore, it is essential that studies
utilizing in-the-wild residual data be designed
to acknowledge and address threats to
individual privacy.
This paper contributes to the high-level
privacy agenda by reviewing existing research
studies of residual data to identify themes.
These themes are then used to identify best
practices in residual data research and present
a compendium of practices for addressing
common legal and ethical considerations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section
two reviews existing studies of residual data.
Section three discusses the ethical and legal
challenges that are present in this form of
research and describes how the previous
studies addressed these challenges. Section four
synthesizes this discussion into a compendium
of practices for managing in-the-wild residual
data during research. Finally, section five
draws conclusions and presents future work
that should be conducted in this area.
REVIEW OF
RESIDUAL STUDIES
This section reviews the methodologies of
previous studies, which recovered and analyzed
in-the-wild residual data. The studies were
selected due to their visibility in academic
literature. The focus and results of the studies
discussed in this section are summarized in
Table 1. For reader clarification, the
investigator referenced in the majority of the
paper is the academic primary investigator of a
research study, unless otherwise stated.
Device Types and Acquisition
Processes
The Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) study
describes the collation of data that eventually
became the Real Data Corpus, a collection of
storage device images used for evaluation of
digital forensic software. The Jones, et al.
(Jones, Dardick, et al., 2009) study is part of a
series of analyses of trends in residual data on
hard disks, beginning in 2005. The Glisson, et
al. (2011), Jones et al. (2008), and Glisson and
Storer (2013) studies investigated residual data
on mobile and handheld devices.
Finally, the Jones et al. (2009) and the
Szewczyk and Sansurooah (2011) studies
investigated residual data on flash storage
devices which consisted of external USB and
memory cards, respectively. All of the studies
broadly followed the same series of activities.
These activities include acquiring their
target storage devices, recovering data and
analyzing the contents of the data recovered.
However, the amount of information provided
on an implemented methodology varied from
study to study. Both the Glisson, et al. (2011)
and the Glisson and Storer (2013) studies
provide an extensive description of the
processes followed and tools used throughout
their experiment. Garfinkel and Shelat (2003)
described their recovery process in detail, but
also use a range of custom software tools for
analysis that are not described in detail.
The sampling methodology is reported in
varying detail in the studies. Glisson, et al.
(2011) described the procedures followed for
selecting devices for purchase from the online
auction site (eBay) and pawnbroker sources
which included location, pricing and auction
format. Jones et al. (Jones, Valli, et al., 2009)
and Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) both describe
tactics used for acquiring devices. These tactics
included buying devices in bulk from major
resellers and buying in small lots to avoid
raising individual seller’s suspicions. Uniquely,
Jones, et al. (2009) sampled devices from a
number of different countries and used several
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different research teams to conduct the analysis.
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Studies In-The-Wild
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Szewczyk &
Sansurooah
2011
   119 18a 14 89
Glisson, et
al. 2011      49 21b 23 0 15
Jones, et al.
2009a      338 55 61 83
Jones, et al.
2009b      43 23 2 20
Jones, et al.
2008      161 10 27
Garfinkel &
Shelat 2003      158 12 117c
a Szewczyk and Sansurooah don't report devices containing personally identifying information. The figure shown is the number of
devices reported to contain resumes and is taken as a lower bound.
b Glisson, et al. did not attempt to determine whether a former owner of a device could be identified through analysis of
residual data. The figure shown is the number of devices reported to contain contact database entries and is taken as a lower
bound.
c Garfinkel and Shelat state that ‘practically all’ hard disks that were successfully imaged and had not been sanitized contained user
deleted files. The figure shown is the total number of hard disks in the study, minus unreadable and sanitized disks.
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A number of studies by Jones et al. (Jones,
Dardick, et al., 2009; Jones, Valli, et al., 2009;
Jones et al., 2008) provide an outline of their
experimental method and tools used, but the
steps taken are not described in detail.
Szewczyk and Sansurooah (2011) reported the
use of processes and tools similar to that of
two of the Jones’ studies (Jones, Dardick, et
al., 2009; Jones, Valli, et al., 2009).
All but one of the studies reported here
acquired mobile devices from a range of
secondary markets, including commercial
resellers of ICT equipment; online auction
sites, such as eBay; public auctions and
pawnbrokers. Consequently, the extent to
which an intermediary may have altered a
storage device before being accessed by the
researchers may vary between studies. In some
of the studies (S. L. Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003;
Glisson et al., 2011; Jones, Valli, et al., 2009),
the researchers acquired the devices
themselves. However, Jones et al.(Jones,
Dardick, et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2008) were
supplied with the devices by an intermediary,
who kept the original source of the devices
confidential while the work was conducted.
Protective Measures
Glisson, et al.,(2011) outlined the training
procedures they followed with their
investigators before allowing them to process
the target devices. The investigators were
instructed in their legal and ethical
responsibilities while working on the study. In
particular, each investigator was asked to sign
a non-disclosure agreement asserting that they
would not discuss the material they viewed
within the laboratory with anyone outside of
the study team. The investigators were then
trained on the software recovery tools using a
sample of ‘safe’ devices known to not contain
personal or sensitive information. Details of
investigator training were not provided in the
other studies.
Glisson, et al.,(2011) describe the
laboratory setup and security procedures used
to conduct their study. All of the equipment
and software used to recover data was housed
in a secured and network isolated room. All
devices studied during the research were also
stored in this location. The room was secured
with a fresh lock limiting access to only the
researchers and investigators. The equipment,
used to analyze the mobile devices, was
connected to a local area network within the
laboratory. An Internet connected machine
located outside of the laboratory was used to
assist the research where necessary for tasks
like using publicly available databases to
acquire additional information on mobile
device models. Finally, no personal digital
devices of any type were allowed in the
laboratory at any time.
Recovered data was temporarily stored on
a single machine until its contents had been
analyzed. Once checked, data was transferred
to a single machine via a local network within
the laboratory and backed up to a separate
external hard disk. This procedure minimized
the risk of illegal data being found on the
storage machine or backup and, therefore,
avoids having to supply the entire data set to
the police. Details of precautions taken in a
laboratory setup were not described in the
other studies.
In the Glisson and Storer (2013) study,
research focuses on residual data from thirty-
two mobile devices that were issued to and
returned by employees in a global Fortune 500
company. A similar detailed data extraction
process was followed that was derived from
their previous case study (Glisson et al., 2011).
Profile of the Data Recovered
The exact purpose and method of analysis
varied between the different studies. Glisson et
al. (2011) categorized each data artefact
recovered according to whether it was
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considered ‘personal’ if the item could be
associated with personal, non-corporate use of
the device, ‘sensitive’ if the item was
considered to be potentially compromising for
the device's former owner; and/or ‘deleted’ if
the analysis indicated that the user had
attempted to remove the item from the device.
Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) were concerned
with investigating the efficacy of device
sanitization practices but also provided
commentary on examples of files recovered
from the hard disks investigated. All of the
Jones studies (Jones, Dardick, et al., 2009;
Jones, Valli, et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2008)
and the Szewczyk and Sansurooah (2011)
study categorized devices in terms of the
presence of identifying information, as well as
providing informal commentary on files
recovered.
All of the studies used the data recovered
to investigate the extent of risks to privacy of
the device's former owners. In addition, the
data gathered by Garfinkel and Shelat (2003)
and Glisson and Storer (2013) have been used
as the basis for evaluating and/or comparing
the performance of digital forensic tools on
real-world data sets.
All of the studies reported significant
amounts of personal, sensitive, personally
identifying and/or corporate data recovered
from the devices examined. Table 1, Studies
In-The-Wild, summarizes the results presented
in the different papers, which are discussed in
more detail below.
Identifying Information
Jones et al. (2009) reported the number of
devices examined which contained personally
identifying information broken down by region.
In total, the study reported that 62 of the 338
hard disks examined contained information
allowing the organization that had previously
owned the hard disk to be identified. Also, 55
contained information allowing individuals to
be identified. Glisson et al. (2011) did not
attempt to determine whether information on
devices examined was personally identifying.
However, they did recover some 1740 contact
database entries from the devices they
examined.
Personally Sensitive
All of the studies recovered information
that could be judged personally sensitive
information to the device's former owner.  For
example:
 Glisson et al. (2011) and  Glisson and
Storer (2013) reported the recovery of
personal photographs containing
(adult) nudity,  probably taken with
the device's camera.
 Garfinkel and Shelat (2003), Jones et
al. (2009), and Glisson et al. (2011) all
report the discovery of health related
information, including medical records,
personal conversations about health
issues (via SMS) and insurance
documentation.
 Glisson et al. (2011) recovered several
probable personal identifying numbers
(PINs) used in banking disguised as
contact information and Garfinkel and
Shelat (2003) recovered thousands of
credit card numbers.
 Garfinkel and Shelat (2003), Jones et
al. (2009), and Glisson et al. (2011) all
reported discovering pornographic
content on the devices examined. In
particular, Jones et al. (2009) reported
discovery of pornography on hard disks
that were identifiable with commercial
organizations.
All of the studies reported finding personal
photographs (including family photographs) on
devices in their corpus.
Commercial and Corporate
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The studies of hard disks, USB devices and
memory cards reported significant amounts of
information from commercial and other
corporate contexts. Szewczyk and Sansurooah
(2011) reported discovery of business plans,
resumes, contact information and pay slips.
Jones et al. (2009) found intellectual property
material relating to a motor vehicle company,
as well as a substantial amount of material
from a legal firm.  In addition, Jones et al.
(2009) also found correspondence concerning
currency transactions worth $50 billion.
Government, Political and Public
The studies by Jones et al., (Jones,
Dardick, et al., 2009; Jones, Valli, et al., 2009)
and Szewczyk and Sansurooah (2011) all found
information relating to government activities,
including documentation from an embassy with
minutes of internal meetings; details of a
government department's budgets and future
plans; and photographs and information on
Ministry of Defence (UK) police officers.
Jones et al. (2009) found extensive material
from educational organizations, such as schools
and universities. These included research
material gathered by a university employee
and lists of students attending a primary
(elementary) school in the United Kingdom.
Illegal Content
Jones et al. (2009) reported that 19 of the
hard disks examined contained ‘illicit’ material.
Illegally obtained software license keys are
reported as an example of this category. In
contrast, Glisson et al. (2011) explicitly stated
that no illegal content was recovered during
their study, despite, for example, discovering
SMS conversations discussing illegal drug use.
For all of the studies examined, it is not
clear what guidelines or standards were
followed in determining that this content was
illegal, illicit or otherwise, in the reported
studies. It may be, for example, that material
was judged to be illicit if it was not actually
criminally sanctionable, but could be the
subject of a disciplinary investigation in a
corporate environment.
‘User Deleted’ Content
Several of the studies reported the extent
of ‘user deleted’ content that was retrieved
from studied devices. This is content that the
user intended to remove from the device but
did not do so successfully. Usually, the
presence of the content is no longer presented
on the user interface but is still resident on the
storage device. This may be due to content de-
registration in a file system, or content that
has been marked for deletion, but the actual
step of removing the bytes of data has not
taken place.
Glisson et al. (2011) found some user data
on all of the mobile devices examined,
however, none of the devices had been
completely or successfully wiped. Hence, user
deleted artifacts were on 15 (31%) of the
devices examined. In contrast, in the Jones et
al. (2008) study 27 (17%) of the devices
examined yielded no user data. No report is
made on evidence of user-deleted data in the
study. This difference between the two studies
may be accounted for by the differences in the
devices examined. A substantial proportion of
the devices examined by Jones et al. (2008)
appear to be older first and second generation
devices, whereas Glisson et al. (2011) focused
on newer devices. In addition, from the
methodological details available, it appears
that Glisson et al. (2011) went to greater
lengths to recover data from the devices they
examined than Jones et al. (2008).
Glisson et al. (2011) reported that they
recovered some 1,934 artifacts as being user
deleted, representing almost 17% of their total
corpus. Glisson et al. (2011) attempted to
investigate the correlation between artefact
category (personal, sensitive) and whether the
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user had attempted to delete them. However,
the sample size was too small to make an
assessment.
In contrast to the Glisson et al. (2011)
study, Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) found that
only 12 (9%) of the hard disks they examined
had been thoroughly sanitized so that no
residual data remained. Of the un-sanitized
disks, they report that ‘practically' all
contained user deleted data.  Similarly, Jones
et al. (2009) reported that 61 (18%) of the
hard disks examined in their study had been
thoroughly sanitized. However, in contrast to
the Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) study, only 83
(25%) of the disks examined were reported to
show evidence of user deletion. This
discrepancy may be due to Jones et al. (2009)
using a more restrictive definition of ‘user
deletion’ in situations where it is clear that the
former owner intended to fully wipe the hard
disk, but failed to do so.
Of the two flash storage studies, Jones et
al. (2009) reported that only two (5%) of the
USB devices studied had been thoroughly
wiped but, in contrast, the Szewczyk and
Sansurooah (2011) study found that 14 (12%)
of the memory cards examined, a far higher
percentage, had been wiped. Additionally, 20
(47%) of the USB devices contained user
deleted, but recoverable, data as compared
with 89 (75%) of memory cards.
Summary
Despite the differences in these studies,
there is a coherent picture from all of them. A
substantial amount of personal and/or
sensitive information was found as residual
data on a variety of storage device types
available from secondary markets. Further, a
large corpus of residual data can be recovered
from relatively small device samples. The
recovery of this residual data presents ethical
and legal challenges when conducting studies
in-the-wild.
CHALLENGES IN
INVESTIGATING
RESIDUAL DATA
This section discusses the legal and ethical
challenges that may be encountered when
conducting residual data research. Where
available, commentary on the issues identified
in the other studies is also referenced. Where
legal concerns are addressed, the discussion
focuses on United Kingdom, European Union
and United States contexts, where a large
portion, but not all of the work described, was
conducted.
Participant Consent
A key principle of studies involving human
participants is the need to establish and
document the participant's informed consent.
In the United Kingdom, exemptions in the
Data Protection Act (UK Parliament, 1998)
permit legitimate researchers, in some
circumstances, to record personal data without
informed consent. However, although collection
of residual data may be lawful, it may not,
necessarily, be ethical. Some of the authors of
this paper, for example, are required by their
employer to follow the British Psychological
Society’s (2010) Code of Conduct for research
involving human participants.
Typically, participants in a study are given
a consent form that describes the purpose of
the study, what data will be collected and how
it and any derived results will be disseminated.
Further, the consent form will normally
describe how personal data will be secured and
destroyed once the research is complete. In
addition, the British Psychological Society’s
(2010) Code of Conduct requires participant's
to be informed, before an experiment begins,
that they can withdraw from a research study
at any time and any data collected, up to that
point, will be destroyed.
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Depending on how a device that potentially
contains residual data is acquired, these
procedures may not be possible for several
reasons:
 It may not be possible to identify
and/or trace the device's owner before
data is recovered and analyzed,
particularly if a device has had many
owners prior to be being acquired for
the purpose of the research. If each
previous owner is treated as a study
participant, each would need to be
informed about the study and prior
consent, for the use of their data
obtained, before the research could
proceed. This may be impossible
without accessing data on the device in
order to identify previous owners.
 It may be difficult to determine who
the ‘participants’ are, in a study of
residual data, for the purpose of
acquiring informed consent. For
example, a device may have had users
who were not the device's owners. In
any case, it is not clear that the
previous owners or users of a device, or
the on-going owners of data on the
device, are ‘participants’ in the
accepted sense of the term, since they
are not actively participating in a
study. However, data about them is
being used in the study.
 Rejecting devices for which researchers
are unable to obtain informed consent
from the original owners and users who
generated residual digital data may
present an unacceptable study bias.
This may be a particular problem
where research investigates the extent
of personal or sensitive artifacts in a
residual data corpus. Former users or
owners may be more likely to withhold
consent where they believe sensitive or
personal data may be found on a
device, regardless of assurances about
privacy and security from investigators.
Consequently, requiring researchers to
obtain informed consent can present
insurmountable challenges to studies
employing residual data.
Device and Data Ownership
As suggested in the challenges section, there is
a distinction between a data owner and a data
storage device owner, or data holder. This
distinction is codified in the United Kingdom
in the Data Protection Act (UK Parliament,
1998).
When an item is purchased, various pieces
of legislation impact product and/or service
interaction. Legislation relating to contract law
is the primary piece of legislation governing
this area. However, consumers are accustomed
to treating ICT equipment, which is purchased
every day, as physical artifacts. Hence, end-
users are lured into treating the contracts
governing the disposal of ICT equipment and
data storage devices in the same manner. This
creates an environment where an organization
sells all of its old equipment at the end of its
life to a reseller and the reseller collects
physical artifacts and considers that to be the
end of the matter.
This view is, however, incorrect because
under the UK Data Protection Act an ICT
data storage device is viewed as not only a
physical device but, also, a logical device. The
logical device has a unique set of legal
requirements that cannot be transferred. The
Logical device will contain not only personal
and corporate data, but also software and
operating system licenses.
There are many different types of software
licenses that can fall into the realm of software
license management. These license types range
from single user license, to original equipment
manufacturer license bundles, to education
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software agreements. Some licenses state that
the license is specific to the machine on which
the software is executing and that the license
to use the software becomes null and void
when the machine is recycled and destroyed.
Others provide the ability for a user to un-
register a machine and to re-register the
software to another machine. While research
investigates the cost of software re-use, the
actual figures on how many organizations fail
to take advantage of this functionality and,
thus, incur the cost of the lost license is not
known. From a software piracy perspective,
the ability to harvest and resell software
licenses from second hand computer hard-
drives offers the ability to potentially generate
significant income.
Under the data protection act, the
organization that generates the personal data
is responsible for processing the data. The data
protection act defines a data controller as “...a
person who (either alone or jointly or in
common with other persons) determines the
purposes for which and the manner in which
any personal data are, or are to be, processed"
(UK Parliament, 1998).
According to the definition in the data
protection act, a data controller or data
controllers must decide the purposes for which
and the way in which personal data are, or will
be, processed. The determination of the
purposes for which personal data are to be
processed is paramount in deciding whether or
not an individual or organization is a data
controller. When a person determines the
purposes for which personal data is to be
processed, a decision as to the manner in which
those data are to be processed is often inherent
in that decision. In particular:
 Personal data shall be obtained only for
one or more specified and lawful
purposes, and shall not be further
processed in any manner incompatible
with that purpose or those purposes.
 Appropriate technical and
organizational measures shall be taken
against unauthorized or unlawful
processing of personal data and against
accidental loss or destruction of, or
damage to, personal data.
 Where processing of personal data is
carried out by a data processor on
behalf of a data controller, the data
controller must, in order to comply
with the seventh principle: choose a
data processor providing sufficient
guarantees in respect of the technical
and organizational security measures
governing the processing to be carried
out, and take reasonable steps to
ensure compliance with those measures.
Therefore, the act places certain
responsibilities on data holders regarding the
custody of data on behalf of data owners.
European legislation provides for similar
regulations. The implication for studies of
residual data in the United Kingdom is that
former owners of data storage devices continue
to retain rights over the data on the device
even after they have sold them. Once the
researchers have obtained the device and
accessed the data, they are acting as data
holders with a responsibility to ensure the
integrity and security of the data on behalf of
the data owners. These responsibilities exist
even though the former owners of the device
will be unaware of the use of the data.
A consequence of these responsibilities is
apparent in the way that results are
disseminated from residual data studies in the
United Kingdom.  All of the studies reviewed
that were based in the United Kingdom
provided only abstracted information on the
types of data artifacts found on the devices
studied. In addition, none of these studies (as
far as is known) have published the raw data
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on which their reports are based. In contrast,
the data gathered by the (S. L. Garfinkel &
Shelat, 2003) study which was based in the
United States has been compiled into a corpus
of storage device images that are made
available to legitimate researchers (S.
Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev, & Dinolt, 2009).
A final aspect of data ownership concerns
disposal. None of the studies describe how
devices were disposed of following the
experiment. Indeed, in the (S. L. Garfinkel &
Shelat, 2003) study, the data recovered is now
available as a corpus for evaluating forensic
software tools and will, hopefully, be
maintained by the researchers indefinitely.
In the United Kingdom, researchers are
under a legal and ethical obligation to ensure
that data collected in a research study is
destroyed once the work is complete (British
Psychological Society, 2010; UK Parliament,
1998). Researchers must ensure that storage
devices that are used for data analysis and the
original devices containing the residual data
are effectively erased. This can be particularly
challenging to achieve when researchers are
working with certain categories of storage
devices such as embedded flash chips. This is
due to less than effective deletion facilities on
individual devices.
Data Protection Laws
Many countries have laws designed to protect
data privacy and security. For instance,
accessing data on a digital storage device
without the permission of the content's
owner(s) could be considered a violation of the
Computer Misuse Act (UK Parliament, 1990)
since it is unlikely that the former owner of a
device conceived or consciously gave
permission for residual data to be accessed by
researchers.
A specific case concerns access to content
that is protected by encryption or access
control mechanisms. In this situation, attempts
by researchers to circumvent controls could be
considered criminal activity. This situation is
complicated because many of the software
tools (such as digital forensic toolkits) contain
features to help investigators bypass controls.
In some circumstances these features are
applied automatically to a device, or the
toolkit is configured to use them by default.
One thing to consider is whether it is
necessary for the purposes of the experiment to
attempt to circumvent these controls. If the
research is only concerned with measuring
readily accessible data, for example, then
storage devices that have been encrypted may
not require further examination.
Even in countries with arguably less
stringent data protection laws (such as the
US), the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 prohibits
the transfer of personal health information
(PHI) from a covered entity (e.g. healthcare
provider, insurance company, or clearing
house) to an entity not involved in patient
treatment or payment for treatment without
the express consent of the individual to which
the data pertains. HIPAA does allow a covered
entity to share PHI with their business
associates provided they agree to provide the
same protections as the covered entity (CMS,
2013).
Encountering Illegal
Information
There is a possibility that a storage device
acquired from secondary sources may contain
data that is considered illegal in a given
jurisdiction. Examples include digital evidence
of conventional criminality such as fraud, drug
dealing or even terrorism; and criminal activity
more usually associated with ICT, notably
illicit pornographic images or videos.
The difficulty for researchers investigating
residual data is in ascertaining the contents of
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a storage device acquired from the secondary
markets without viewing illegal material, which
could be a criminal act in some jurisdictions.
From the research study's perspective, there is
the risk that any illegal content will also
‘contaminate’ legal material recovered from
other storage devices, since police investigators
may need to confiscate all storage devices
identified as containing illegal material.
Glisson et al. (2011) described a procedure
for minimizing this risk in their study. The
procedure involved storing data recovered from
a device on a single PC while it was examined
by an investigator. Once it had been
determined that the data did not contain any
illegal content, it was added to the corpus.
This meant that should illegal content be
discovered, only the hard disk from the PC
used for analysis would need to be supplied to
the police.
Glisson et al. (2011) also established
procedures for research investigators to report
illegal content to legal authorities if and when
it was discovered. The research investigators
were trained to immediately report the
discovery of potentially illegal content,
whenever they were in doubt, to one of the
lead researchers. If the researcher determined
the content was illegal, the hard disk on which
the content was stored was to be removed and
transferred to a safe until it could be provided
to the police. This procedure minimized the
risk of researchers or investigators being
prosecuted for holding illegal content.
Risk to Stakeholders
From these studies we have identified five
unique categories of individuals who may
experience risk arising from a study of residual
data on ICT devices.  These include:
 Previous owners
 Previous device users
 Others who have interacted with
previous owners or users
 Researchers and Research assistants
 Current device owners (if not owned by
the researchers)
We will discuss the risks to each group.
Risk to Previous Owners
A blatant threat to the previous device
owner(s) is the risk of privacy violations. For
many individuals, ICT devices function as a
modern day multimedia diary complete with
photos, text and email conversations, and even
GPS logs. A secondary, but related, risk
involves user security. Risks in this category
can involve issues of personal and financial
security. Personal security could be
compromised if device data can be used to
predict where an individual might be at any
given time (Grispos, Glisson, Pardue, &
Dickson, 2015). Financial security could be
compromised if account passwords or near field
communication payment information is
recovered from the device. Lastly, legal
liability can arise if the previous owner(s)
engaged in illegal behavior with the device,
such as hacking or viewing child pornography.
Information recovered from the device could be
used as evidence in legal proceedings. Legal
liability can also arise when devices are used
for legal activities (such as a physician
accessing patient records) and practitioners fail
to take steps to ensure that residual data does
not remain on the device (HIPAA violation).
Risk to Previous Device Users
In some cases, the previous users of the
device were never the owners of the device.
This can occur in situations when an
organization issues devices to its employees for
work-related purposes. The risk to these users
is similar to those of previous device owners,
however, privacy expectations are, generally,
lower when using corporately-owned devices.
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Risk to Others Who Have Interacted With
the Device
While most studies focus on the risk to
those who have actually come into contact
with the device, it should not be forgotten that
the main function of ICT’s is communication.
Therefore, those who have communicated with
the device being studied are also at risk.
Residual text messages, emails, and pictures
are good examples of sensitive data that can be
left behind on a device and present a risk to an
individuals’ privacy.
Risks to researchers and research
assistants
Researchers and research assistants
encounter different kinds of risk when
conducting research in this area. An obvious
risk is the discovery of data that initiates
involvement in a legal investigation and an
accompanying loss of data.  Some of the
studies examined earlier in this paper detailed
the extensive measures taken to ensure that
any illegal data found would be turned over to
the authorities and that the illegal data would
be isolated from the rest of the data collected
so that researchers would not lose access to all
of their data if computers, hard drives, and
devices were turned over to the authorities. A
second, but less obvious, risk is the
psychological risk associated with exposure to
data of a highly personal nature. Previous
studies indicate that there is an elevated risk
of depression among those who deal with the
sensitive personal data of others such as social
workers and those in healthcare (Health.com,
2010). Hence, it is plausible that having access
to large amounts of sensitive personal data
could trigger depression in researchers as well.
Risks to device owners (if not owned by the
researchers)
Lastly, organizations or individuals who
make devices available to researchers also face
some risk depending on the country in which
the research is being conducted. As noted
earlier, data protection laws in Europe and
other places can be more stringent than those
in the United States. While in the US,
ownership of data transfers with the device on
which the data resides, this is not true in some
countries (e.g. UK). These laws could open
device owners up to legal liability for allowing
researchers to access owned devices. Even in
countries with less restrictive data protection
laws, legal liability can arise from
organizational data (such as patient treatment
data) being accessed by researchers outside of
the organization unless agreements are signed
beforehand that protect the organization and
its data.
The various risks acknowledged in this
section prompted deliberations focusing on
protecting stakeholders and mitigating risk. In
an attempt to achieve this goal, the following
residual data research practices have been
compiled.
RECOMMENDED
RESIDUAL DATA
RESEARCH PRACTICES
This segment presents recommended practices
for conducting research using in-the-wild
residual data. These practices are based on the
experiences reported in the sections
investigating the Review of Residual Data
Studies and identifying the Challenges in
Investigating Residual Data.
Identifying Research
Objectives
Before beginning a research study using
residual data it is important to be clear about
the objectives and rationale for the work. In
particular, because of the sensitivity of
material that may be gathered, it is important
to ensure that the use of residual data is
essential for the objectives of the study. A
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study to determine the extent of privacy risks
on a particular category of storage devices can
be justified in using residual data. Research
work to develop a realistic corpus of material
for evaluating forensic software can also be
justified, since there are currently no other
methods for constructing such a corpus. In
contrast, studies that intend to use devices
obtained from the secondary market purely
because they are cheaper are unlikely to
receive ethical approval. In these
circumstances, the justification is not based on
the objectives of the research, but on cost
grounds, which is normally inadequate.
Similarly, when devising data recovery
methods for acquired devices, it is important
to consider what tools are appropriate to meet
the research objectives and minimize privacy
threats to former device owners. For example,
a study that is concerned with monitoring
trends in sanitization procedures may not need
to use tools, which visualize the contents of a
storage device. Tools or scripts, which only
determine whether a device has been
thoroughly sanitized, may be sufficient.
Investigator Training
Providing investigators with the foundation for
conducting research on devices that contain
real data is critical. Investigators need to be
trained on how to use data extraction tools
whether they are commercially available or
open source.
Training not only impacts the amount of
overall data that is potentially recoverable but
it also helps to deter contamination
possibilities. Investigators need to be made
aware that they may be exposed to unpleasant
information and even potentially illegal
information. Procedures need to be explicitly
identified and presented to the investigators on
how to handle these situations. This training
should also include educating investigators on
the importance of data privacy and the signing
of non-disclosure agreements.
There is the possibility that investigators of
digital devices could run across passwords to
email, cloud storage services or social
networking web sites. Investigators need to be
instructed to never, under any circumstances,
access data on outside systems through the
device they are examining or other computers
involved in the extraction or analysis of
residual data. In addition, access to extracted
data should be highly regulated.
Device Acquisition
Management
Storage devices containing residual data can be
obtained from a variety of sources and under
different circumstances, for example:
 donated by volunteers;
 purchased from secondary markets,
such as pawnbrokers and auction sites;
 loaned from resellers or original
equipment manufacturers, prior to
destruction;
 loaned from a third party that
maintains its own device corpus;
 obtained from lost property
departments;
 acquired from a corporate IT
department's device life-cycle
management processes.
The source of residual data may have
implications for data ownership, and
consequently for the methods employed in
recovering, analyzing and disposing of data,
depending on the jurisdiction in which research
is conducted.
Issues of device and data ownership, when
sourcing from secondary markets, were
discussed in the challenges section. Different
constraints may arise, for example, if the
devices are on loan, since there may be an
obligation to return the devices to the provider
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unaltered. In these situations, it may be
necessary for researchers to establish what
actions will be taken with a device set after it
is returned to the provider and factor these
constraints into the study's objectives and
methodology. Researchers may be required to
transfer possession of storage devices to
criminal investigators if illegal content is
discovered.
Devices acquired from a corporate IT
department may be subject to very different
legal and ethical constraints. It is not unusual
for corporate organizations to require users of
IT equipment to transfer ownership of data
created and/or held on the devices to the
organization. Consequently, researchers may be
under relaxed legal constraints when working
with residual data sourced from corporate
environments, since they may never act as
data holders. However, work in this context
may still give rise to ethical dilemmas. For
example, results of a study of residual data
might reveal examples of misbehavior by
employees of an organization. It is not clear
whether the results of studies of residual data
should be available to managers in an
organization in order to take disciplinary
action. Regardless of the ethical position,
researchers should at least be clear about the
objectives of a research study with an
organization and the limits to which results
can be used, before data recovery and analysis
commences.
Data Anonymization
The anonymization of extracted residual data
is beneficial to all parties involved, directly or
indirectly, with the research. It protects
potentially sensitive information of participants
like credit card numbers, national insurance
numbers, Global Position System (GPS) data
on images stored on devices, medical
appointments, and sensitive company
documents. Hence, all data should be
anonymized through the presentation of the
information in broad categories and
generalities.
Lifecycle Security Practices
A description of security measures for
protecting participant data is a standard part
of approval and consent procedures for studies
involving human participants (UK Parliament,
1998). Details typically include a description of
how data will be stored and who will have
access to the data. However, security practices
with residual data need to be considerably
more robust than for data recorded for
conventional experiments with human
participants. As noted above in the Challenges
section, it is unlikely that data owners will
have provided explicit consent for data to be
gathered. Consequently, any data recovered
may contain information that a ‘participant’
might not ordinarily volunteer.  In addition, it
is important to develop practices that ensure
data integrity should it be necessary, at a later
point in time, to transfer this information to
the police for a criminal investigation.
Glisson et al. (2011) described their
procedures for securing the residual data they
recovered from mobile devices using a
combination of physical and electronic
measures. All equipment and acquired devices
were stored in a physically secured and
network isolated laboratory. Personal
electronic devices not associated with the
research were not permitted in the room. The
hard disks of the machines used to recover
data were erased after the experiment was
complete. The corpus was stored on an
encrypted and physically secured hard disk for
future analysis. Finally, the corpus of devices
was stored in a physically secure location after
data had been recovered.
As noted above, none of the studies
addressed the disposal of residual data and
devices after the completion of an experiment.
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This is, however, a crucial aspect of ensuring
the on-going privacy of the device's former
owners. Re-selling devices on secondary
markets may be a tempting proposition to
reduce costs associated with a study. However,
storage devices need to be thoroughly erased
before decommissioning and disposal. Where it
cannot be guaranteed and demonstrated that
this has occurred (when investigating
embedded storage devices, for example), it may
be necessary to contract a reputable
organization to ensure that the entire device is
destroyed.
A further option to consider is obtaining
independent audits of the security procedures
employed while residual data is being held for
research. This can be undertaken on a
reciprocal basis by other researchers with
experience in conducting research with residual
data.
Ethics Committee Liaison
Research utilizing in-the-wild residual data is
still relatively scarce, so it is unlikely that the
members of an institution's ethics committee
will have previous experience in handling both
legal and ethical issues. Hagen et al. (2005) has
argued that ethics committees are
(understandably) ill-equipped to manage the
legal and ethical issues involved in ‘in-the-wild’
research in general.
Consequently, effective liaison between the
research team and the relevant institution's
ethics committee is essential throughout the
conduct of the study. As well as explaining the
usual objectives and rationale for the research,
applications for ethical approval for residual
data research should be accompanied by:
 a justification for the use of residual
data in the research;
 an explanation of why the research
cannot be effectively conducted using
non-residual data sources;
 a description of the ethical concerns
and risks raised by the use of residual
data; and
 a description of the steps taken to
address or mitigate these concerns.
Contact should be maintained between
researchers and the ethics committee during
the gathering and analysis of residual data. In
particular, it is important for the ethics
committee to be informed should any of the
risks described during the approval process be
manifested. Demonstrating competence in
managing these issues can help alleviate
concerns as to the risks for future research.
However, researchers should accept that in
some circumstances it may be necessary for an
ethics committee to halt a research study when
such risks are manifest.
Finally, it is helpful to provide a summary
report to the ethics committee after the
research is complete. Supplying ethics
committee members with papers describing the
results of the research can help ease approval
processes in this difficult area for future
research studies.
International Residual Data
Gathering
Of the studies examined, only the Jones et al.
(2009) research appears to have attempted to
compare residual data risks between multiple
countries or legal jurisdictions. In their case,
data recovery and analysis took place in each
country (Australia, France, Germany, United
Kingdom and United States) independently,
with only the summary information from each
country collated in the study findings.
Policy makers in the European Union and
the United Kingdom have already begun to
suggest that data transfer beyond their borders
may be problematic, due to differences in
regulatory approaches to data protection
(Information Commissioner's Office, 2012;
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Working Party, 2012). Wolthusen (2009) has
argued that these regulatory issues will make
criminal investigation of digital crimes across
borders more problematic in the future. It is
likely that these complexities will be no less
problematic for privacy researchers.
Regulation of data ownership and rights
appear far more permissive in the United
States than in the European Union. It is
unclear whether, for example, the Data
Protection Act (UK Parliament, 1998) would
apply to residual data collected in the United
States and transferred to the United Kingdom.
Certainly, it would seem that regulations
prevent a similar transfer of (non-residual)
data to the United States (Grispos, Storer, &
Glisson, 2012). Any researcher intending to
transfer raw residual data across international
boundaries should certainly seek legal advice
before doing so.
CONCLUSIONS
This research reviewed the available studies
that have used residual data In-The-Wild. The
studies to date have focused on residual data
recovered from several different digital storage
technologies (hard disks and flash media chips)
integrated in a range of ICTs, including
desktop and laptop personal computers,
servers, external USB storage, mobile devices
and handheld devices. These early studies have
already demonstrated the extent of personal,
sensitive and identifying information available
from residual data sources. This work has
meant that the first steps in estimating the
risks of residual data to individual and
corporate privacy have begun to be
investigated and quantified. The work has also
provided impetus for ICT vendors to improve
life-cycle protections for user privacy in the
products they offer.
Investigating residual data for research
purposes carries its own privacy risks, as
identified in this paper. The synthesis of the
study methodologies presented in this paper
provides a compendium of good practices to
guide other researchers working with residual
data. Future studies of residual data may seek
to integrate and adapt these practices in a
variety of ways. Researchers in the future, for
example, may seek to use sources of residual
data to validate findings from other research
methodologies.
Alternatively, researchers may begin to
address the residual data risks in other ICTs
that have not been examined to date. The data
sources considered so far concern relatively
small-scale storage capacities. However, data
storage is increasingly becoming remote and
virtualized. Social media applications, for
example, enable users to record huge quantities
of data about their private lives, which may be
difficult to alter or erase if an account becomes
abandoned. These environments present both
new opportunities and risks for researchers
working with residual data. Existing principles
and practices will need to be substantially
altered, if residual data methodologies are to
be used in recovering, analyzing and
understanding residual data in these
environments. Acknowledgments
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